We present an experimental study investigating the effect of social identity on hiring decisions under uncertainty. We want to know whether people discriminate between own and other group candidates. The key feature of the experiment is to consider whether they do so in individual, as well as in joint decisions. The analysis indicates that in spite of not exhibiting discriminatory behavior when deciding individually, participants discriminate if they have an incentive to coordinate their decision with a co-decision maker. Our experiment thus suggests a rationale for discrimination additional to those considered in the literature and provides empirical evidence of it. That is, we show that people may discriminate not because of their individual attitudes, but because of expectations of what their co-decision makers will do, or because of what they expect that their co-decision makers expect them to do, etc. Furthermore, we analyze which particular configurations of the social identities of the decision makers and candidates lead to biases in decisions.
Introduction
Discrimination matters because of fairness and efficiency concerns.
1 Identifying and tackling discrimination is, however, a difficult task, and discrimination persists in many countries and various spheres of life.
2 Discrimination is often related to social identities, i.e. people are treated differently based on which social group they belong to. In this paper we focus on the question whether decision makers discriminate between candidates belonging to their own group and candidates belonging to another group in hiring decisions under uncertainty. We want to know whether they do so when making decisions alone. But we also want to know, and this is a key question, whether and when people discriminate in joint decisions, i.e., in situations where they have an incentive to coordinate their decision with a co-decision maker.
We conducted a controlled experiment to investigate the basic questions presented above concerning the relationship between discrimination and social identity. In our experiment, decision makers had to make project assignment decisions about project candidates with uncertain productivity. Each decision maker made some individual as well as some joint decisions. In joint decisions they had an incentive to coordinate their decisions with a co-decision maker. As the goal of the experiment was to study whether group identity plays a role in such hiring decisions, the main treatment variable was group identity. In identity sessions participants were randomly divided into two groups, and each of these groups separately underwent a group identity building stage, before proceeding to the hiring decisions. That is, we created groups and induced group identities in the lab. In control sessions participants proceeded directly to the hiring decisions.
We first present some key features of the study and we then summarize its main results. First of all, by inducing group identities in the lab, one can abstract from the specificities of relations within and between groups existing in society (e.g. men and women), as well as from the influence of tastes and stereotypes existing in society about particular groups (e.g. white American and African American). We thus focus on the basic question whether people treat members of the own and of the other group differently. Our experiment therefore complements studies based on happenstance data about social groups existing outside the lab such as Shayo and Zussman (2011) , who analyze decisions of Arab and Jewish judges in Israeli small courts claims and find that judges from both groups exhibit an in-group bias, i.e. preferential treatment of their own group. Given the prolonged and violent ethnic conflict in Israel and the complexity of Arab-Jewish relations, one question that arises is the generalizability of this finding of in-group bias. Is the preferential treatment of the own group a result of the specific nature of ArabJewish relations or is it a more general phenomenon? Furthermore, can biases in favor of the own group also arise in peaceful and non-conflictual situations? In our experiment there is no conflict of interest between the two groups involved. If we observe an in-group bias even under the weak group identities created through a fleeting interaction in the lab, one would expect that biases related to identification with long existing real social categories would be even stronger.
Second, a key feature of our study is that we are able to compare the actions that people undertake when deciding alone with those they undertake when having to coordinate with a co-decision maker in otherwise identical situations, something that is not feasible in an uncontrolled environment. By documenting whether there are systematic differences in observed behavior in these alternative set-ups, we can enhance our understanding of the sources of discrimination. In particular, does discrimination necessarily result from individual attitudes or can it also arise from strategic considerations about co-decision makers' behavior? A better understanding of the rationales behind discriminatory actions can inform our thinking on anti-discrimination policies. Note that the two prominent economic explanations of discrimination, the taste for discrimination (Becker, 1971 ) and the statistical discrimination frameworks (e.g. Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993) focus on discrimination grounded in individual attitudes.
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Third, studying whether and when discrimination related to social identity arises when people have to coordinate decisions is important, as the real world abounds with cases in which two or more people make a joint decision about a third party. Examples include hiring, promotions, examinations, allocation of public contracts, juries, as well as many more informal decision situations.
4 By conducting a controlled experiment which abstracts from the many specificities and complicated institutional set-ups of such situations, as well as from the stereotypes in society about the particular groups involved, we investigate systematically whether and when the configuration of own/other group identity matters in joint decisions. Our conjecture is that if there are biases related to the configurations of the social identities of the parties involved in a simple situation in which people have an incentive to coordinate decisions about a third party, then such biases might be also present in more complicated situations, in which they might be difficult to uncover due to the multiplicity of additional uncontrolled factors involved. We consider the effect of group identity under the framework of project assignment decisions. We believe, however, that our investigation might offer some insights for domains beyond the particular example considered, as discrimination related to group identities can arise in many types of social interactions, and the forces behind it might be quite general.
The main finding of the experiment is that participants do not exhibit discriminatory attitudes in individual decisions, but they nevertheless discriminate when trying to coordinate their decision with another person. Analyzing under which particular configurations of the social identities of the parties involved discrimination arises, we find that there is no discrimination in joint decision making when the decision makers come from two different groups, but there is strong discrimination in favor of own group candidates when the two decision makers are of the same group. Thus, the data show that who makes a decision with whom matters. We also elicit the candidates' beliefs about the decision makers' hiring decisions and find that they are in line with the actual choices made by the latter.
Our design allows us to disentangle whether discrimination is due to positive treatment of the own group, or to negative treatment of the other group, or to both. We find that when deciding with someone from the own group, participants do not negatively discriminate against other group candidates, but they do strongly favor own group candidates.
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Our findings illustrate that people may discriminate even in the absence of individual discriminatory attitudes as long as there are social norms or expectations of discrimination in society. Such expectations of discrimination may be self-fulfilling in situations in which decision makers have an incentive to coordinate. Thus, by highlighting this difference between the individual and the social dimension of discrimination, we suggest and document empirical evidence of another rationale for discrimination, complementary to those considered in the literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss some related literature. Section 3 presents details of the experimental design and implementation, while section 4 lists our hypotheses. In section 5 we present our analysis of the experimental data. Section 6 is a discussion of the results, and section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the literature on how social identity affects decisions. The role of social identity has been widely recognized and researched in various fields such as sociology, anthropology, social psychology, philosophy, and history. Experimental findings 5 This is important as in the real world accusations of discrimination between members of the own and of the other group are often countered with the argument that one treats candidates of the other group according to their "objective" characteristics. But positive and negative discrimination may be two sides of the same coin, and the existence of positive discrimination of the own group, rather than negative discrimination of the other group, may be no less harmful in terms of efficiency and fairness consequences.
from social psychology show that even when people are divided into two groups in the laboratory on the basis of something as unimportant as aesthetic preferences, and even when they expect no future interactions with one another, they discriminate between members of the own and of the other group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . This discriminatory treatment has two aspects. First, people overvalue the characteristics of the members of the in-group compared to those of the members of the out-group. And second, when asked to allocate a number of tokens between a member of the in-and a member of the out-group, they give more to the in-group member.
6 Social Identity Theory explains why this may happen (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982) : people are categorized and self-categorize into groups, they identify with their group, and they derive self-esteem from a high status of the in-group. Favoring the in-group over the out-group thus brings them higher utility. A number of recent experiments in economics have investigated whether group identity may affect decisions in various situations of strategic interaction. Some of these studies consider the effect of natural social identities, i.e., social group affiliations existing outside the laboratory (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006) . Some other studies induce group identity in the laboratory, either by dividing people into two groups based on their aesthetic preferences as in social psychology experiments (Chen and Li, 2009 ), or by randomly dividing people into two groups, assigning a label to each group and using some method to strengthen group identity (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011) . The methods used to strengthen group identity include working with the group on an unrelated common problem (either paid or unpaid) in a predecision making stage to create a shared experience, introducing payoff interdependence for members of a group for this common problem, introducing competition between the groups for the solution of this common problem, and the presence of an audience from the own (other) group during the decision making stage. The consensus appears to be that just randomly dividing participants into two groups and labeling them is insufficient to induce group identity effects. However, if additionally to the labeling people are asked to undergo a common experience such as working on a common problem with their group, the sense of identification created through this common experience is sufficient to generate differences in subsequent behavior towards own and towards other group members (Chen and Chen, 2011; Eckel and Grossman, 2005) .
The general finding of these studies is that identity may affect decisions in various situations. Eckel and Grossman (2005) find that random assignment of people to teams with additional inducement of team identity can increase contributions in a public goods game. Charness et al. (2007) find that if group identity is sufficiently primed it has 6 For a comprehensive overview article, see Brown (2000) .
an effect on coordination in the Battle of the Sexes and on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The potential of induced group identity to learn to overcome risk considerations and coordinate on a Pareto superior outcome in the Minimum Effort Game is illustrated by Chen and Chen (2011) . Chen and Li (2009) use a number of different games to quantify differences in altruism, reciprocity, and punishment towards in-and out-group members. Klor and Shayo (2010) find that subjects vote for a tax policy that benefits the social group they belong to if the personal monetary costs of doing so are not too high. Li et al. (2011) find that group identity affects the choice of trading partners and the prices realized in an experimental oligopolistic market. Finally, Goette et al.'s (2006) study involving members of two different tribes in Papua New Guinea and Bernhard et al.'s (2006) study involving members of different platoons in the Swiss Army show that group identity may matter for punishment decisions.
Our paper is also related to the experimental literature on discrimination. Discrimination in a labor market context has been investigated in an interesting field experiment by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) . They sent CVs of equally qualified job candidates to employers. Some of the CVs bear white and others African American sounding names. They find that employers' callback rates differ. Some other experimental studies on discrimination focus on disentangling whether discrimination towards particular social groups is statistical or due to preferences, and find that the answer depends on the particular environment and social groups considered. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) use the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games to investigate the nature of discrimination among Israeli Jews, in particular between Jews of Ashkenazic and Eastern origin. Falk and Zehnder (2007) conduct the trust game with inhabitants of different districts in Zurich. Gneezy et al. (2012) present an extensive field experimental study of the rationales behind discrimination based on gender, age, sexual orientation, race, and disability in different markets. These studies show that taste based and statistical discrimination explanations can account for some discrimination in various settings.
The Experiment

Design and Implementation
Our experiment investigates hiring decisions. The goal of the experiment was to study whether group identity plays a role in such decisions. The main treatment variable is therefore group identity, and we have two types of sessions -control sessions without group identity, and treatment sessions with group identity. In both types of sessions the subjects made some individual as well as some joint decisions. Thus, we have a 2x2 design, with the type of decision being the second treatment variable. Details of the two types of sessions will be presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
There were twelve subjects in each session. In identity sessions participants were randomly divided into two groups of six, and each group underwent an identity building stage before proceeding to the hiring decisions. In control sessions participants proceeded directly to the hiring decisions. At the beginning of the hiring stage, subjects received instructions about this stage and completed an understanding questionnaire. They were told that for each situation in which they have to make a decision, they would be randomly and anonymously matched with some other participants. After receiving all instructions subjects were assigned either the role of decision maker or of project candidate, which they kept until the end of the session. In each session, eight subjects got the role of decision makers and four the role of project candidates. The roles were assigned randomly and anonymously, making sure that in identity sessions in each of the two groups there were always four decision makers and two project candidates.
Each decision maker made some individual as well as some joint decisions. Individual decisions meant she had full decision power. In joint decisions, two decision makers decided anonymously and independently of each other whether to hire a candidate or not. They had an incentive to coordinate, and if their decisions were not coordinated, no hiring decision was implemented. Each project candidate, on the other hand, was asked for her beliefs about what the decision makers would do in certain hiring situations. During the experiment subjects would never receive any feedback about any decisions taken by them or others.
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2012 at Queen Mary, University of London. All 192 participants were undergraduate students at Queen Mary. The instructions for the identity sessions are included in Appendix B (supplementary material).
7 We ran eight control and eight identity sessions (see Table 1 ). Control sessions lasted about an hour and identity sessions lasted about an hour and a half. The average earnings across all sessions were £19.13, which included a £3 show up fee.
Control Sessions
Each decision maker in a control session made four hiring decisions. Two of them were individual decisions, and two of them were joint decisions (see Table 2 ). In an individual decision making situation, the decision maker has a budget of £3.42 and has to decide whether to assign a project to a candidate or not. If she does not assign the project to the candidate, the decision maker can keep the budget for herself. If she assigns the project to the candidate, the decision maker has to pay the candidate £3.42 for her services. The decision maker does not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but knows that chances of success are p in 100. If the candidate completes the project successfully, the decision maker will get £x. If the candidate does not complete the project successfully, the decision maker will get £y.
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The two joint decisions that the decision maker faced involved the same two sets of parameter values as the individual decisions. The difference is that the decision makers are told that there are now two of them, and each of them has to decide independently whether to assign the project to the candidate or not. If both decision makers decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project is not assigned, and each of them keeps the £3.42 for herself. If both decision makers decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project is assigned, and each of them has to pay the candidate £3.42 for her services. If the two decision makers make different decisions, then no project assignment decision is implemented, and each decision maker incurs a disagreement cost of £3, to be deducted from her budget.
Each candidate in a control session was presented with the four questions a decision maker faced, and was asked for each case what she thought the decision maker would do. A candidate received £3 for each correct answer.
The two sets of parameter values used were: p 1 = 35 in 100, x 1 = £9.70, y 1 = £0.50 for one of the individual questions, and p 2 = 45 in 100, x 2 = £6.40, y 2 = £0.60 for the other individual question. They were chosen so that under both sets of parameter values we could expect that in the absence of group identity there would be some subjects who choose to assign as well as some subjects who choose not to assign the project to the candidates (see also Holt and Laury, 2002; Ambrus et al., 2009) .
9 Note that for each decision situation candidates were asked whether a decision maker would assign or not assign a project to a candidate. That is, we elicited "yes" and "no" answers rather than probabilistic beliefs. This enables us to have corresponding data for the beliefs of the project candidates and for the actual behavior of decision makers.
Identity Sessions
In identity sessions, group identity was induced in the lab in a stage preceding the hiring decisions. Group assignment was random. Upon entering the room each subject drew an envelope, which contained either a blue or a green slip of paper. If a person drew a blue slip, they were told that they will be in the blue group and if they drew a green slip, they were told that they will be in the green group. In each identity session there were six blue and six green group members. After the general instructions, the members of a group were asked to sit together around a table. Each group, then, received eight paintings, four of them labeled "Artist 1", and four of them labeled "Artist 2".
10 They were told that they can discuss the paintings, and that afterwards they would be given four more paintings without labels, and would have to identify for each of these four paintings whether it was by artist 1 or by artist 2. Answers were individual, and a participant received £2 for each correct answer. After the identity induction stage, participants were asked to return to their individual seats. They were given the instructions for the hiring stage and the understanding questionnaire, before receiving their decision sheets. At that point, the six participants of each group were randomly and anonymously assigned the roles of either decision maker or candidate. In each group there were four decision makers and two candidates.
Each decision maker in an identity session made six decisions in the hiring stage. Note that the difference with the decision situations in the control sessions is that the description of the decision situation included the group identity of the decision maker and the group identity of the candidate that the decision was about. For example, you are a "blue" decision maker and you are randomly matched to a "green" project candidate. One individual decision was about a candidate of the own group under one set of parameter values, and the other individual decision was about a candidate of the other group using the other set of parameter values. Besides these two individual decisions, each decision maker also made four joint decisions: one with a decision maker of the own group about a candidate of the own group, one with a decision maker of the own group about a candidate of the other group, one with a decision maker of the other group about a candidate of the own group, and one with a decision maker of the other group about a candidate of the other group. Note that for each decision maker the set of parameter values used for questions about own group candidates differed from the set used in questions about other group candidates (see Table 2 ).
Each project candidate in an identity session answered six questions about what she thought a decision maker would do in each of the six situations described above. 
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Comparisons and Discussion
The design of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 1 . We will compare choices in identity sessions with choices in control sessions, both for the individual and for the joint decisions (comparisons 2 and 6). We will also compare behavior in individual with behavior in joint decisions both in identity and in control sessions (comparisons 3 and 4). In addition, in identity sessions we will analyze how the choices depend on the configurations of the identities of the decision maker(s) and the candidate (comparisons 1 and 5). Some of these comparisons are within-subjects (3 and 4) and some are betweensubjects (1,2, and 6). Comparisons 5 consist of some within-subjects and some betweensubjects comparisons. In particular the comparisons of behavior towards own and towards other group candidates are between-subjects. By making a between-subjects comparison of the behavior towards own and towards other group candidates, the design of the experiment specifically avoids testing for blatant discrimination. We would have been testing for blatant discrimination, if we had asked a decision maker to make decisions about two absolutely identical members of the own and of the other group. This could potentially induce experimenter demand effects, as decision makers would easily notice that the candidates differ only in their group identity. Therefore, as a precaution against the subjects becoming aware that we are testing for discrimination, we vary not only the group identity of the candidates that a decision maker faces, but also the parameter values attached to them. That is, in our set up a decision maker faces own group candidates with one set of parameter values, and other Additionally, note that a decision maker does not have to choose directly between an own and an other group candidate, but is asked separate questions about whether she would assign the project to a blue candidate with parameter value set i, and whether she would assign the project to a green candidate with parameter value set j. This is done to avoid pure focality effects such as the salience of choosing a blue over a green candidate when the two decision makers are blue. and indirect. Direct discrimination refers to differential treatment of own compared to other group candidates. Indirect discrimination is differential treatment of candidates belonging to a certain group (either own or other) compared to the decision makers' treatment of candidates in control sessions. Looking at indirect discrimination allows us to capture the effect of group identity on decisions. Combining the analysis of direct and indirect discrimination helps us to disentangle whether more hiring of own than of other group candidates is due to positive discrimination towards the own group, or to negative discrimination towards the other group, or to both. Positive discrimination occurs when candidates belonging to a particular group are treated better than candidates in the case without group identity. Negative discrimination occurs when they are treated worse.
The joint hiring decisions are framed as a coordination problem. Such a coordination problem is a stylized representation of a wide range of social interactions. Most directly, it captures situations in which decision makers have to reach a common decision without having the opportunity to communicate with one another. But its relevance is much broader than this. Whenever two people have to undertake a common decision, even if communication is allowed, there is most often a pre-communication stage in the decision making process, in which each person considers for herself what to do and what she thinks the other person will do. In many of these situations people will care not only about the decision to be implemented but also about not spending time on discussions, as time involves opportunity costs. They would like to be coordinated already prior to communicating. The joint decision making situation in our experiment is an approximation of this pre-communication stage, and the miscoordination cost that we introduce captures the costs of disagreeing. Note that even in cases when decision makers will have an opportunity to communicate later or to engage in repeated interaction, the choices they make in the first pre-communication stage may have an effect on which outcome is realized later, because the initial choices can influence their beliefs about each other.
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Hypotheses
The main goal of our analysis is to understand whether any group-identity related discrimination occurs and if so, what type of discrimination this is. There are four types of questions that we are interested in, and therefore four groups of alternative hypotheses. The first question we are interested in is whether there is discrimination in individual decisions. Second, we want to know whether a person takes different actions when she tries to coordinate with a co-decision maker than when deciding alone. Third, do decision makers discriminate between own and other group candidates when making a decision with another person? And fourth, how do the interactions of the identities of the two decision makers and the candidate affect decisions in the joint decision making case? To answer these questions, we use the comparisons indicated in Figure 1 . Our general null hypothesis will be that behavior in any pair of situations compared does not differ.
Our hypotheses on behavior in individual decisions are derived, on the one hand, from the taste for discrimination model, and on the other hand, from the findings of in-group bias in the social identity literature. According to Becker (1971) , an employer will discriminate between members of two groups if she has a positive taste towards one group and/or a negative taste towards the other group. It has been established in social identity experiments that people exhibit an ingroup-bias, i.e., they treat members of the own group more favorably than members of the other group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . We therefore hypothesize that if an in-group bias or a taste for discrimination in favor of the own group or against the other group exists, then members of the own group will be hired more than members of the other group. If there is a positive taste for the own group, then members of the own group will be hired more than candidates in control sessions. If there is a negative taste against the other group, members of the other group will be hired less than candidates in control sessions.
Furthermore, we conjecture that the exact configurations of the group identities of the parties involved may affect decisions in the joint decision making case. This conjecture is based on the fact that there are empirical studies using happenstance data that find biases in decisions related to the configurations of the race identity of the parties involved in jury decisions in US criminal trials (Anwar et al., 2012) , and the gender identity of those involved in examination committee decisions for the Spanish judicial system (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010). To form the hypotheses on behavior related to joint decision making cases, we combine the hypotheses for the behavior of the two individuals involved. Therefore, some of the hypotheses of behavior in joint decisions will be one-directional and some will be two-directional. An example of a one-directional hypothesis is the comparison of the decisions of two people of the same group about candidates of their own group with the decisions of two people of the same group about candidates of the other group. According to our hypothesis on individual behavior, each of the two decision makers is expected to favor candidates of the own group and to discriminate against candidates of the other group. Therefore, we expect that when two people of the same group make decisions about candidates of their own group they will hire more candidates than when two people of the same group make decisions about candidates of the other group. An example of a two-directional hypothesis is the comparison of the decisions of two people from different groups about candidates from either of these groups, when one individual may be expected to favor and the other to discriminate against the candidate.
The following precise hypotheses will be tested in our analysis of the experimental data. The numbered comparisons in brackets refer to our design chart (Figure 1) .
Note that the project candidates in the experiment are presented with the same situations as decision makers, and are asked what they think a decision maker will do in each situation. Therefore, the above hypotheses are tested not only with respect to what decision makers do, but also with respect to the project candidates' beliefs.
Discrimination in Individual Decisions
-There is direct discrimination and an in-group bias in individual decisions, i.e., more hiring of own than of other group candidates in the presence of group identity (comparison 1 in the design chart).
-There is indirect positive discrimination of the own group and negative discrimination of the other group in individual decisions, i.e., own group candidates in identity sessions are hired more than candidates in control sessions, and other group candidates in identity sessions are hired less than candidates in control sessions (comparison 2).
Differences in Behavior in Individual versus Joint Decisions
-There is a difference in behavior in individual versus joint decisions in control sessions (comparison 4). -There is a difference in behavior in individual versus joint decisions in identity sessions (comparison 3). -There is a difference in behavior in individual versus joint decisions in identity sessions depending on the type of candidate and on the type of co-decision maker (comparison 3).
Discrimination in Joint Decisions
-There is direct discrimination and an in-group bias, i.e., people hire more own than other group candidates in joint decisions (comparison 5).
-There is indirect positive discrimination of the own group and negative discrimination of the other group in joint decisions (comparison 6).
Differences in Joint Decisions Depending on Identity of Codecision Maker and Candidate
-There is direct discrimination and an in-group bias in joint decisions with an own group decision maker, i.e., people hire more own than other group candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker (comparison 5).
-There is positive discrimination of the own group and negative discrimination of the other group in joint decisions with an own group decision maker (comparison 6).
-There is direct discrimination in joint decisions with an other group decision maker (comparison 5).
-There is indirect discrimination in joint decisions with an other group decision maker (comparison 6).
-There are differences in decisions about own group candidates depending on the identity of the co-decision maker (comparison 5).
-There are differences in decisions about other group candidates depending on the identity of the co-decision maker (comparison 5).
Experimental Analysis
In this section we report our statistical analysis of the experimental data, testing the hypotheses presented in section 4. We focus on the relative frequencies with which individual decision makers decide to assign a project to a candidate in different individual as well as joint decision situations. We will call this the 'frequency of hiring' in our analysis. Thus, for example, a relative frequency of hiring of 0.70 in joint decisions in identity sessions means that in 70% of the cases an individual decision maker decided to assign the project to a candidate in these sessions.
14 As each relative frequency of hiring in a session constitutes an independent observation, we have 8 independent observations for control, and 8 independent observations for identity sessions. An overview of all statistical tests is presented in Table 3 for the decision makers' behavior and in Table 4 in Appendix A for the corresponding candidates' beliefs. For the statistical significance of differences in any matched pairs and related samples (i.e., all within-sessions comparisons) we use the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. For the statistical tests of all independent samples (i.e., between-sessions comparisons) we use the Robust Rank Order Test. The significance level chosen is α = 0.10 (unless otherwise stated). The subsections in our analysis below correspond to those presenting the hypotheses in section 4. In each subsection we first present our analysis of the decision makers' behavior, followed by that of the candidates' beliefs. Figure 2a shows the data on individual hiring decisions. There is no difference in the overall hiring rate in individual decisions between control and identity sessions (both 0.59). We are interested in whether there is direct discrimination, i.e., differential treatment of own and of other group candidates in individual decisions in identity sessions. Own group candidates are hired at a rate of 0.61, which is slightly higher than the 0.58 hiring rate of other group candidates. As to indirect discrimination in individual decisions, the hiring rate of own group candidates in identity sessions is two percent higher than the hiring of candidates in control sessions (0.61 versus 0.59). The hiring rate of other group candidates in identity sessions is one percent lower than the hiring of candidates in control sessions (0.58 versus 0.59). These differences are all in line with the hypotheses on discrimination in individual decisions, but they are neither substantial nor statistically significant. Figure 2b shows the project candidates' beliefs about individual hiring decisions. They are in line with expectations of direct discrimination -in particular candidates expect a 6% higher hiring rate of own than of other group candidates in identity sessions (0.69 versus 0.63). Their beliefs also indicate expectations of negative indirect discrimination against other group candidates, with a 9% lower expected hiring of other group candidates than of candidates in control sessions (0.63 versus 0.72). These differences are not statistically significant.
15
Discrimination in Individual Decisions
Result 1:
We do not find substantial or significant evidence of discrimination in individual decisions.
Differences in Behavior in Individual versus Joint Decisions
We are next interested in whether individuals decide differently when they decide alone compared to when they have to coordinate their decision with a second person. We test for such differences in decisions in both control and identity sessions, in order to understand whether they are simply driven by the fact that the decision is joint rather than individual, or whether they are caused by the effects of the social identities of the decision makers and the candidates. Figure 3a shows the decision makers' behavior in individual and joint decision situations in control and identity sessions. In control sessions the difference in hiring in individual versus joint decisions is 3% (0.59 versus 0.62) and not statistically significant. However, in sessions with group identity, hiring in joint decisions is 11% higher than hiring in individual decisions (0.70 versus 0.59). This difference in hiring rates is substantial and statistically significant. Thus, group identity seems to induce decision makers to hire more when deciding with another person compared to when deciding alone.
Project candidates in both control and identity sessions believe that individual decision makers will hire more when deciding alone than when deciding jointly ( Figure  3b ). This is the opposite of the decision makers' actual behavior. In control sessions this difference is statistically significant, in identity sessions it is not.
Result 2a: In the absence of identity, the difference in hiring in individual versus joint decisions is small and not statistically significant.
Result 2b: In identity treatments decision makers hire substantially and significantly more candidates in joint than in individual decisions.
To learn more about what drives this increase in hiring in joint decisions compared to individual decisions in identity sessions, we decompose the decisions according to the identities of the candidate and of the co-decision maker. As Figure 4a shows, when deciding with an own group decision maker, individuals hire 17% more own group candidates than when deciding individually (0.78 versus 0.61, difference statistically significant). When deciding with other group decision maker, individuals hire 6% more own group candidates than when deciding individually (0.67 versus 0.61, not statistically significant). Figure 4b shows that there are also increases in the hiring of other group candidates in joint decisions, both with own and with other group decision makers (8% and 9%, respectively), although these increases are not statistically significant.
Result 2c: In identity sessions, decision makers hire substantially and significantly more own group candidates in joint than in individual decisions. This increase in hiring of own group candidates in joint decisions is driven by the large and significant increase in hiring of own group candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker. There is no decrease in hiring of other group candidates in joint decisions compared to individual decisions, regardless of the identity of the co-decision maker.
Discrimination in Joint Decisions
The next question we are interested in is whether there is discrimination and in-group bias in joint decisions. That is, do individuals hire more own than other group candidates when trying to coordinate with another decision maker? And in case such discrimination exists, we also want to know whether it is driven by negative discrimination towards other group candidates, by positive discrimination towards own group candidates, or by both. We first test the hypothesis of direct discrimination and in-group bias, i.e., in identity sessions, is there more hiring of own than of other group candidates? As Figure 5a shows, hiring of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions is 7% higher than hiring of other group candidates (0.73 versus 0.66). Although not statistically significant, this difference is consistent with the direct discrimination hypothesis.
Next, we examine whether this difference is due to negative discrimination of other group candidates, or to positive discrimination of own group candidates, or to both. As Figure 5a shows, the hiring rate of other group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions is 0.66, which is 4% higher than the hiring rate of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions (0.62). This is not statistically significant and is contrary to our hypothesis of negative discrimination of other group candidates.
We do, however, find a big difference in hiring of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions compared to hiring of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions (0.73 versus 0.62). This difference of 11% is statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level, indicating strong positive discrimination of own group candidates in joint decisions. That is, although people do not negatively discriminate against other group candidates in joint decisions, they discriminate by strongly favoring own group candidates. Figure 5b shows the project candidates' beliefs about hiring in joint decisions. Their expectations of hiring of own group candidates are 10% higher than their expectations of hiring of other group candidates (0.66 versus 0.56). They do not expect any negative discrimination, on the contrary, their expectations of hiring of other group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions are 4% higher than their expectations of hiring of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions (0.56 versus 0.52). Their beliefs are in line with strong positive discrimination, i.e., their expectations of hiring of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions are 14% higher than their belief about hiring of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions (0.66 versus 0.52), which is statistically significant at α = 0.05. Though not all of these differences in beliefs are statistically significant, they are all consistent with, and in fact very close to, the decision makers' actual behavior. It seems especially interesting that the project candidates' beliefs are in line with the decision makers' actual behavior of no negative discrimination against other group candidates and very strong positive discrimination of own group candidates in joint decisions. 
Differences in Joint Decisions Depending on the Identity of the Co-decision Maker and the Candidate
We now disentangle the differences in joint decisions further by focusing on the importance of the identity of the co-decision maker. First, we test whether people discriminate when deciding with an own group decision maker. Second, we look at whether people discriminate when deciding with an other group decision maker. Third, we analyze whether the frequency with which individuals hire own group (or other group) candidates depends on the identity of the co-decision maker. As Figure 6a shows, when deciding with someone from their own group, individual decision makers hire 12% more own group candidates than other group candidates (0.78 versus 0.66), which is statistically significant at α = 0.05, indicating strong direct discrimination. Hiring of own group candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker is 16% higher than hiring in joint decisions in control sessions (0.78 versus 0.62), indicating again strong positive discrimination of the own group (statistically significant at α = 0.05 level). But there is no negative discrimination towards other group candidates when deciding with someone from their own group. In fact, when deciding with an own group decision maker, hiring of other group candidates is 4% higher than hiring of candidates in control sessions (0.66 versus 0.62), although this difference is not statistically significant. Figure 6b shows the corresponding project candidates' beliefs. Project candidates' expectations are that decision makers will hire 13% more own group candidates than other group candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker (0.69 versus 0.56), although this difference is not statistically significant. They believe that decision makers deciding with someone from their own group about own group candidates will hire 17% more candidates than decision makers in control sessions (0.69 versus 0.52), which is significant at the α = 0.05 level. The expected hiring rate of other group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group is 4% higher than the expected hiring rate in joint decisions in control sessions (0.56 versus 0.52). Thus, project candidates correctly anticipate that people discriminate when deciding with someone from the own group. They also correctly anticipate that this discrimination is driven by strong positive discrimination of own group candidates by decision makers, and interestingly, their predictions are in line with there being no negative discrimination of other group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group.
Result 4a:
There is strong and significant direct discrimination when deciding with someone from the own group. Analyzing indirect discrimination shows that although there is no negative discrimination towards other group candidates, there is substantial and significant positive discrimination of own group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group.
The next question is whether people discriminate when deciding with someone from the other group. As Figure 6a shows, there is no difference in the relative frequencies of hiring of own and other group candidates when deciding with an other group decision maker (both at 0.67). Both hiring of own and of other group candidates are a few percent higher when deciding with an other group decision maker than in control sessions (0.67 versus 0.62), but this difference is not statistically significant. This suggests that no discriminatory behavior arises when decisions are made with someone from the other group. Figure 6b shows that the project candidates expect that decision makers will favor own group candidates even when deciding with an other group decision maker (0.63 versus 0.56), but this difference is not statistically significant.
Result 4b: People do not discriminate between own and other group candidates when
deciding with someone from the other group.
Next, we look at the role that the identity of the co-decision maker plays for hiring of own (or other) group candidates, comparing explicitly the effect of the co-decision maker being of the own group with the effect of her being of the other group. As Figure  6a shows, hiring of own group candidates is 11% higher when deciding with someone from the own group than when when deciding with someone from the other group (0.78 versus 0.67). This difference is statistically significant at α = 0.05 level, and is related to some of our findings above. That is, compared to hiring in joint decisions in control sessions, in identity sessions decision makers hire significantly more own group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group, whereas there was not such a significant difference when deciding with someone from the other group. Thus, own group candidates are favored when decisions are made with an own group co-decision maker.
The hiring rate of other group candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker is approximately the same as when deciding with an other group decision maker (0.66 versus 0.67), which, as we saw already above, is slightly and insignificantly higher than in control sessions. Thus, for behavior towards other group candidates the identity of the co-decision maker does not play a role.
As Figure 6b shows, project candidates believe that decision makers hire 6% percent more own group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group than when deciding with someone from the other group (0.69 versus 0.63). Although not statistically significant, this difference has the same sign as the bias in the actual hiring decisions. Similarly, project candidates believe that when a decision maker needs to make a hiring decision about an other group candidate, it does not make a difference whether the codecision maker is from the own or the other group (0.56 hiring rate in either case), and this corresponds to how decision makers actually behave. 
Discussion
The main result of our investigation is that as far as discrimination in hiring is concerned, social identity matters very much. More specifically, we can summarize our findings as follows. First, identity does not seem to play a role in individual decisions about candidates. Overall hiring rates in individual decisions in control and in identity sessions do not differ, and we do not find support for tastes of discrimination in favor of own group candidates or against other group candidates.
Second, in the presence of group identities, an individual hires more candidates when trying to coordinate with a co-decision maker than when deciding individually. This increase in hiring in joint decisions appears to depend on the presence of group identities, as a comparison of hiring in individual and joint decisions in the absence of group identities, i.e., in control sessions, does not show such a difference in hiring rates.
Third, hiring of own group candidates increases significantly in joint compared to individual decisions. Particularly pronounced is the increase in hiring of own group candidates when deciding with someone from the own group.
Fourth, we find no decrease in hiring of other group candidates when deciding jointly compared to individually regardless of the identity of the co-decision maker, which suggests that there are no mutual expectations of discrimination against other group candidates, or that people do not wish to appear discriminatory against other group candidates.
Fifth, we find discrimination, i.e., more hiring of own than of other group candidates in joint decisions. But although there is strong positive discrimination of own group candidates, there is no negative discrimination of other group candidates.
Sixth, we find that discrimination in joint decisions arises only in decisions with an own group decision maker, as there is no discrimination between own and other group candidates when deciding with an other group decision maker. Seventh, in most cases the corresponding beliefs by the project candidates about the hiring decisions by the decision makers are in line with the actual choices made by the latter. Project candidates' beliefs are consistent with the discrimination observed in joint decisions. In particular, the candidates correctly believe that there is no negative discrimination of other group candidates, but strong positive discrimination of own group candidates in joint decisions.
There are several possible explanations for the effect of social identities on joint decisions. For a start, any particular configuration of group identities serves as a common public signal perceived by both decision makers. This allows for the realization of correlated equilibria. Although the public signal may act as a coordination device, note that the signal is a priori uninformative as to which of these many equilibria to play.
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The public signal prompts beliefs in each decision maker regarding the social norm of behavior for that configuration of group identities, and it is these beliefs that constitute the essential difference with individual decisions. Thus, for example, when two decision makers of the same group try to coordinate on a decision regarding a candidate of their own group, they consider not only what they individually would prefer to do, but also what they expect the other to do, and what the other in turn expects them to do, and so on. Decision makers, then, choose between hiring and not hiring in such situations depending on their beliefs about the strength of the social norm of favoritism of the own group, or about negative discrimination of the other group in the population. What our experimental analysis shows is that there are strong mutual expectations about the existence of a social norm of favoritism of the own group. Such beliefs, although not grounded in the behavior that individuals exhibit when making decisions alone, 18 are self-fulfilling in joint decisions. Thus, even if individually the two decision makers do not favor their own group, favoritism in joint decisions can arise if there is (the belief of) a social norm to favor one's own group. One of the aims of our experiment was to test for and document the beliefs about such social norms. A further possible explanation for the increase of favoritism of own group candidates in joint compared to individual decisions has to do with accountability.
19 That is, in joint decisions a subject does not feel morally accountable for discrimination or favoritism, as she has the 'excuse' that her decisions are not driven by personal prejudice but by beliefs about what other people will do, or what they expect her to do. The fact that a bias in hiring induced by group identity shows up in joint decisions but not in individual decisions could also be related to such a bias being simply too weak to manifest itself significantly in the individual decisions. With joint decision making, however, the group identity might perhaps become more reinforced. For example, an individual blue decision maker may not find group identity a convincing argument to hire a blue candidate. But if there are two blue decision makers deciding about a blue 17 Note that in our hiring game there are two pure strategy equilibria (either both hiring or both not hiring), and that the presence of group identities as such does not make one of these equilibria more focal than the other. When facing a single candidate, decision makers have to decide whether to hire her or not. Decision makers never face a direct choice between own and other group candidates. If, for example, two blue decision makers had needed to coordinate their choice between a blue and a green candidate, hiring of the blue candidate could have been seen as a focal equilibrium. But in our experiment subjects never faced such a choice.
18 As our analysis showed, decision makers favor own group candidates only in joint decisions.
19 See e.g. Dana et al. (2007) .
candidate, the fact that there are more people with the same group identity involved might prime a stronger sense of group belonging among the decision makers, and hence more hiring of blue candidates.
Conclusion
We conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of group identity on hiring decisions, and we found that people show substantial and significant discrimination in joint decisions. What is worth noting is that this occurs in spite of the fact that they do not exhibit discriminatory preferences in individual decisions. The data illustrate that if there are for some reason a social norm or expectations of discrimination in society, such expectations can become self-fulfilling when people have to coordinate decisions, even though these are not grounded in individual preferences. We presented some possible explanations as to why this may be the case. Further research into these possible explanations seems warranted. Our contribution is thus to demonstrate that discrimination can arise not only in situations when an individual decision maker has tastes for discrimination or different beliefs about two groups of candidates, but also when she simply has an incentive to coordinate decisions with other decision makers. Thus, even if individually all decision makers are non-discriminatory, discrimination can arise if there are expectations or social norms of discrimination.
We believe our research findings are important for several reasons. First, our work on joint hiring situations complements the existing theoretical and experimental literature on discrimination as it presents a possible explanation for discrimination that had not been recognized in the literature yet.
Second, our experimental findings constitute evidence that this new possible explanation for discrimination is empirically relevant, as the subjects in our experiment substantially favored their own group in joint decisions, especially in cases in which they had to coordinate decisions with a co-decision maker of the own group. The real world abounds with situations in which two or more people in one way or another make a joint decision about a third party; from hiring, promotions, examinations and juries to allocation of public contracts, as well as many more informal decision situations. Our empirical results on the importance of group identities in joint decision making should instigate further experimental research on the effect of social identity in more complex decision making environments.
Third, the fact that we find that people discriminate in particular when making joint decisions with someone from the own group, and not when making decisions with someone from the other group suggests that there might be some reason to be concerned about decision making bodies consisting of members of only one social group, e.g. exclusively male (female) or exclusive white (black) hiring committees. Our findings suggest that conducting controlled experiments with real social identities such as gender and race should be interesting for further research as well.
Fourth, a feature worth noting is that the discrimination we find in joint decisions is somewhat hidden -there is no negative discrimination towards other group candidates, but there is strong favoritism of own group candidates. However, the result is still discrimination, i.e., differential treatment of own and other group candidates with similar characteristics just because they belong to a particular group, and though masked as positive rather than negative, such discrimination may be far from benign, raising both efficiency and fairness concerns. 
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